Commentaries on article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention: exchange of information by Castro Bosque, Marina et al.
  
WP 2020-01 
ISSN 2659-8183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commentaries on article 26 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention: exchange of 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marina Castro Bosque 
Hugo López López 
Esther Marcos Rodríguez 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers of the Iberoamerican Observatory of 
International Taxation. Commentaries to the 
Iberoamerican Tax Treaty Network 
  
 
 
Serie:  Working Papers of the Iberoamerican Observatory of 
International Taxation 
Subserie:  Commentaries to the Iberoamerican Tax Treaty 
Network 
 
Número:  2020-01 
ISSN:  2659-8183 
Serie disponible en  https://e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/28167 
 
Edita:   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
 
Dirección/coordinación de la serie:  Andrés Báez Moreno (andres.baez@uc3m.es) 
  Eva Escribano López (eva.escribano@uc3m.es)  
Observatorio Iberoamericano de Tributación 
Internacional (OITI) 
Carrera 1 nº 12-66 Casa de las Mandolinas, Bogotá 
(Colombia) 
 
Web:  http://www.oiti.org 
Correo electrónico:  secretaria@oiti.org 
 
Creative Commons Reconocimiento-
NoComercial- SinObraDerivada 3.0 España  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
COMMENTARIES ON ARTICLE 26 OF THE OECD MODEL TAX 
CONVENTION: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION1 
Marina Castro Bosque2 
Hugo López López3 
Esther Marcos Rodríguez4 
Abstract: The information exchange clause contained in Article 26 of the OECD MTC has 
evolved to become an instrument that has effectively increased the possibilities of obtaining and 
exchanging information to fight tax avoidance and tax evasion. This may be inferred from analysis 
of the Ibero-American network of Double Taxation Conventions.  
However, such evolution raises some issues yet to be tackled. As an example, the provision has 
not considered the taxpayers’ rights and guarantees in the course of the information exchange 
procedure. Also, the evidence value of documents which despite being obtained illegally, have 
been lawfully exchanged at an international level through cooperation instruments, remains 
problematic. In the same vein, its retroactive application and the time limits of the clause are also 
questionable.  
This paper aims to discuss all of these conflicts and, if possible, to provide some solutions in this 
respect.  
Keywords: Art. 26 OECD MTC – Exchange of Tax Information - Ibero-American network of 
DTCs.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the tax information exchange clause contained in 
Article 26 of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(hereinafter ‘OECD’) Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. In the course of 
this analysis particular attention will be paid to the Latin American context. In order to 
achieve this aim, the paper has been divided into two different sections:  
The first one refers to the historical development of the Article and its Commentaries. 
Thus, a series of general conclusions are drawn, among which the evolution of the 
information exchange clause as an instrument that increasingly allows greater 
possibilities of obtaining and exchanging information to fight tax avoidance and tax 
evasion more effectively is emphasized. However, as also noted, the provision has not 
considered the taxpayers’ rights and guarantees in the course of the information exchange 
procedure. Likewise, as discussed below, in the Ibero-American network of Double 
Taxation Conventions, most part of the OECD MTCs have not been updated and an old 
wording of the information exchange clause is still applied.  
The second section examines specific issues of particular relevance raised by the 
information exchange clause in the context of Latin American DTCs. Specifically, 
reference is made to the foreseeable tax relevance of the information exchanged and to 
the different types of information exchange. Subsequently, based on a case-law analysis, 
the section deals with the challenges arising from the evidence value of documents which 
despite being obtained illegally, have been lawfully exchanged at an international level 
through cooperation instruments. In addition, an examination of some issues related to 
the opposition grounds to the information requirement and the retroactive application and 
time limits of the clause is also carried out. Finally, a brief reference is made to the role 
and functions of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ARTICLE 26 OECD MTC  
1. Historical developments 
The idea of creating a Draft Model Tax Convention to solve the problems arising from 
double taxation among OECD Member States first emerged in 1956 within the Fiscal 
Committee forum. Shortly after, in 1963, a Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income 
and Capital, as agreed upon by the Fiscal Committee, was presented5.  From its origins, 
it was highlighted the need to periodically review the Model Convention and its 
Commentaries in order to align them to the changing conditions and common practices 
of Member States. Thus, the permanent relevance of the OECD MTC in international 
taxation would be guaranteed6. In this section, the main amendments to Article 26 OECD 
MTC regarding exchange of tax information will be analyzed. 
 
1.1.  Phase 1. 1963 OECD Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital7. 
Article 26 of the 1963 Draft Convention consisted of two sections. Both the scope and 
restrictions on the information exchange were mostly evidenced in the literal wording of 
the article, as shown below: 
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information 
as is necessary for the carrying out of this Convention ~ and of the domestic laws of the 
Contracting States concerning taxes covered by this Convention insofar as the taxation 
                                                          
5 2017 OECD MTC, par. 6. 
6 SERRANO ANTÓN, F. (2003) “La modificación del Modelo de Convenio de la OCDE para evitar la 
doble imposición internacional y prevenir la evasión fiscal. Interpretación y novedades de la versión del 
año 2000: la eliminación del artículo 14 sobre la tributación de los servicios profesionales independientes 
y el remozado trato fiscal a las partnerships”. (Crónica tributaria no. 106) pp. 67-100. 
7 As for September 2017, the DTCs following Article 26 of the OECD MTC are: Argentina-Germany, 
Argentina-Brazil, Brazil-Austria, Brazil-Canada, Brazil-Denmark, Brazil-Ecuador, Brazil-Spain, Brazil-
Philippines, Brazil-France, Brazil-Hungary , Brazil-Italy, Brazil-Japan, Brazil-Luxembourg, Brazil-Czech 
Republic, Brazil-Slovak Republic, Brazil-Sweden, Brazil-Netherlands, Bolivia-Germany, Grenada-
Switzerland, Ecuador-Germany, Ecuador-Brazil, DTC CARICOM (Guyana, Jamaica), Jamaica-Germany, 
Jamaica-Canada, Spain-Austria, Spain-Brazil, Spain-Denmark, Spain-Finland, Spain-Netherlands, Spain-
Japan, Spain-Morocco, Spain- Czechoslovakia, Spain-Romania, Spain-Tunisia, Portugal-Germany, 
Portugal-Austria, Portugal-Belgium, Portugal-Finland, Portugal-France, Portugal-Ireland, Portugal-Italy, 
Portugal-Mozambique, Portugal-United Kingdom, Dominican Republic- Canada. It is also followed by the 
DTCs signed between Granada-United Kingdom, Granada-South Africa and Jamaica-United Kingdom. 
However, these conventions deviate when it comes to the grounds for opposition.  
 
 
 
thereunder is in accordance with this Convention. Any information so exchanged shall 
be treated as secret and shall not be disclosed to any persons or authorities other than 
those concerned with the assessment or collection of the taxes which are the subject of 
the Convention.  
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on one of 
the Contracting States the obligation:  
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws or the 
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;  
b) to supply particulars which are not obtainable under the laws or in the normal 
course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;  
 c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, 
commercial’ or professional secret or trade process, or information, the 
disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public). 
As can be noted, this first wording was solely inserted for the smoother application of the 
Double Taxation Agreement and, in line with the solution given to the problems arising 
from double taxation8, it was not intended to serve as an independent mutual assistance 
instrument between States9. 
In accordance with this purpose, the 1963 version of Article 26 of the OECD MTC was 
established as a minimum clause whose objective scope was limited to the exchange of 
information deemed necessary for the application of the DTC and the national laws 
regarding taxes under its scope. In view of reinforcing this provision, the Commentaries 
to the article established that the exchange of information that had as its purpose the 
administrative cooperation between countries to avoid tax fraud or evasion should be 
specifically provided for by the Contracting States, either in the same Convention, either 
in an independent bilateral agreement10.  
                                                          
8 M. RING, D. (2016) “Article 26: Exchange of Information” /in/ VANN. R. Global Tax Treaty 
Commentaries, (IBFD) p. 9. 
9 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1963, para. 6.  
In this vein, FERNÁNDEZ MARÍN, F. (2006) El intercambio de información como asistencia tributaria 
externa del Estado en la Unión Europea, (Tirant lo Blanch) p. 39. 
10 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1963, para. 6.  
 
 
The first section also stated that only the exchange of information deemed necessary was 
authorized under the scope of the Convention. This requirement had two implications: 
firstly, the exchanged data had to be of tax significance for the requesting State and, at 
the same time, the requesting State should have used all means available to obtain the 
information before making the request (principle of subsidiarity) 11. The necessary nature 
of the information could be verified by the requested State by asking the requesting State 
to provide the facts and legal conditions to demonstrate it12. 
On the other hand, it was established that States could exchange information ‘insofar as 
the taxation thereunder is in accordance with this Convention’. This way, the objective 
scope was also limited to those taxpayers to whom the Convention was applicable; that 
is, those who were residents of one of the two Contracting States13. 
In addition to the limitations imposed to the objective and subjective scope of application, 
the modalities by which information could be exchanged were also restricted. Thus, the 
only form of information exchange provided by Article 26 was the exchange under 
request14. However, States could carry out spontaneous and automatic exchanges of 
information if so agreed in a bilateral agreement15.  
Moreover, the information exchanged could only be disclosed to the persons or 
authorities concerned with the assessment or collection of the taxes under the scope of 
the DTC (art. 26.1 in fine OECD MTC 1963). This configuration of the confidentiality 
clause envisaged in the original wording offered greater protection compared to 
subsequent versions of Article 26, as it was an autonomous secrecy rule which did not 
depend on the level of protection of the requesting State16. However, despite the literal 
                                                          
11 CALDERÓN CARRERO, J.M. (2008) Convenios fiscales internacionales y fiscalidad de la Unión 
Europea  (Wolkers Kluwer), p. 585 and VOGEL K. (1997) Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 
Third Edition,  A Commentary to the OECD, UN and U.S. Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation of Income and Capital, With Particular Reference to German Treaty Practice, (Ed Kluwer, 3rd 
Edition) p. 1406. 
12 F. DEBELVA y N. DIEPVENS (2016) “Exchange of Information. An Analysis of the Scope of Article 
26 OECD Model and Its Requirements: In Search for an Efficient but Balanced Procedure” (Intertax: 
International Tax Review; Vol. 44) p. 300. and VOGEL, K. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. 
A Commentary to the OECD, UN and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of 
Income and Capital. With Particular Reference to German Treaty Practice, op. cit, p. 1406.   
13 M. RING, D.: “Article 26: Exchange of Information”, op. cit. 10. 
14 Specifically, Commentaries to Article 26 para. 7 stated that ‘the rule laid down in paragraph I of the 
Article presupposes that information shall be exchanged only on application’. 
15 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1963, para. 8. 
16 OBERSON X. (2012) International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global 
Transparency, (Elgar Tax Law and Practice series), p. 24; ADONNINO, P., (1995) Cooperación 
 
 
wording of the Article, several scholars understood that the information could also be 
used in tax procedures and criminal proceedings to prosecute and repress tax fraud and 
evasion17. 
The exchange thus provided was mandatory to the extent that the requested State had the 
information at the time of the request or could obtain it in accordance with its normal 
administrative practice. However, this State was not required to undertake measures that 
demanded special investigations or a particular examination of the taxpayer’s 
accounting18.  
The information exchange was neither mandatory when the opposition requirements 
provided for in the second section of the Article were met. However, exchanges of 
information that fulfilled these characteristics were possible insofar as they were covered 
by the national legislation of the transmitting State19. That is, if any of the conditions 
listed in the Article were met, the exchange would become discretionary for the 
Contracting States20. 
These opposition grounds can be grouped into three different categories as follows:  
(i) Principles of reciprocity and proportionality (Art. 26. 2 a) and b) OECD MTC).  
In accordance with these provisions, the requested State may oppose the exchange request 
under two circumstances: when the exchange involves the adoption of administrative 
measures at variance with the laws or the administrative practice of any of the Contracting 
State; or in cases where such exchange overrides national regulations or exceeds the 
regular course of the administrative practice of any of the Contracting State. 
These provisions constitute an expression of the general principle of reciprocity 
governing the information exchange procedure whose purpose is to prevent a Contracting 
State from taking advantage of the differences of the information system from another 
                                                          
administrativa y modalidades de intercambio de información entre Administraciones Fiscales nacionales, 
(CIAT), p. 26. 
17 OBERSON X.: International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global Transparency, 
op. cit. p. 25  
18 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1963, para. 12. 
19 CALDERÓN CARRERO, J.M. (2000) Intercambio de información fiscal y fraude fiscal internacional, 
(Madrid: Centro de Estudios Financieros), p. 122. 
20 Ibid, p. 220; VOGEL, K., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. A Commentary to the OECD, 
UN and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital. With 
Particular Reference to German Treaty Practice, op. cit. p. 1919. 
 
 
State if such operation was not allowed by its own national administrative regulations or 
practice21.  
In this sense, the aforementioned sub-sections also integrate what is known 
internationally as the “lowest common denominator” clause. This clause was conceived 
to establish a balance in the information exchange obligations between States, so that the 
most restricted legislation and practice of the States stands as the threshold above which 
the exchange is not mandatory22. 
Nevertheless, given the obvious variations in practices and procedures between States, 
the strict interpretation of this principle may render the information exchange without 
effect. As a mechanism to avoid the consequences of a narrow application of the Article, 
the Commentaries provide the contracting States for the possibility to reach an agreement 
based on the mutual agreement procedure contained in article 25 of the Model 
Convention. 
In addition to the principle of reciprocity, subsections a) and b) of Article 26 establish 
that the principle of proportionality must also be respected. Under this principle, the 
administrative intervention has to be proportionate to the objective pursued - the correct 
management of the tax system - and the least burdensome means must be used23. 
(ii) The secrecy of the information (Art. 26.2 c) OECD MTC). 
This section also reserves the right of the Contracting States not to exchange the 
information when such information is of a secret nature. Thus, provided that the 
information could disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial or professional 
secret or trade process, the Contracting State is not obliged to carry out the exchange.  
Note that this enumeration is not exhaustive, but rather it is choice of the Contracting 
States to add more waivers to the obligation to provide the information if deemed 
necessary. In this regard, it is important to mention the explicit possibility introduced by 
                                                          
21 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1963, para. 11. 
22 CALDERÓN CARRERO, J.M.: Intercambio de información fiscal y fraude fiscal internacional op. cit., 
p. 162; LÓPEZ FEITO, F., (1993) “Guía de la OCDE sobre el intercambio de información fiscal entre 
Estados”, (Cuadernos de Formación, no. 24, Inspección de Tributos), p. 4.  
23 MUÑOZ VILLARREAL, A. (2012) “Límites al intercambio internacional de información tributaria”, 
/in/ COLLADO YURRITA, M. A. and MORENO GONZÁLEZ, S. Estudios sobre Fraude Fiscal e 
Intercambio Internacional de Información Tributaria, (Barcelona: Atelier) pp. 257-277, citing RUIZ 
GARCÍA, J. R., (1988) Secreto bancario y hacienda pública: (el deber de colaboración de las entidades 
bancarias en el procedimiento de gestión tributaria), (Madrid: Civitas) p. 114.   
 
 
the Commentaries to use bank secrecy as a reason for opposition. As will be discussed 
further on, this opposition ground was amended in the following versions of the MTC. 
The assumptions are not defined in the Convention but it is the national legislation that 
establishes its specific content and extension. The divergence of concepts may entail an 
infringement of the principle of reciprocity as the extension of the confidentiality right 
differs between Contracting States24. 
(iii) Ordre public (Art. 26.2 c) in fine OECD MTC) 
Finally, States are not obliged to carry out information exchange when it is contrary to 
public policy. This suggests that the exchange request can be refused when fundamental 
or essential principles of national regulations are breached25.  
 
1.2. Phase 2. 1977 OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital26. 
In 1971, in light of the experience acquired by the States when negotiating and applying 
DTCs, as well as the increase in international tax relations and the emergence of new 
                                                          
24 OBERSON X.: International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global Transparency, 
op. Cit, p. 34. 
25 Ibid, p. 35.  
26As for September 2017, the DTCs following this Model are: Argentina-Australia, Argentina-Belgium, 
Argentina-Denmark, Argentina-Finland, Argentina-France, Argentina-Netherlands, Argentina-Italy, 
Bolivia-Sweden, Brazil-China, Brazil- Finland, Brazil-Israel, Brazil-Portugal, Brazil-Trinidad Tobago, 
Chile-France, Chile-Ireland, Chile-Norway, Chile-Paraguay, Chile-Portugal, Chile-United Kingdom, 
Chile-Russia, Chile-South Africa, Chile- Sweden, Cuba-China, Ecuador-Belgium, Ecuador-France, 
Ecuador-Mexico, Spain-Algeria, Spain-Australia, Spain-Bulgaria, Spain-China, Spain-Korea, Spain-
Ecuador, Spain-United States, Spain-Egypt , Spain-Slovenia, Spain-Estonia, Spain-Philippines, Spain-
France, Spain-Greece, Spain-Hungary, Spain-India, Spain-Indonesia, Spain-Ireland, Spain-Iceland, Spain-
Israel, Spain-Italy, Spain -Lituania, Spain-Malaysia, Spain- Mexico, Spain-Norway, Spain-Portugal, Spain-
Russia, Spain-Venezuela, Spain-Belgium, G uyana-Canada, Jamaica-China, Jamaica-Denmark, Jamaica-
France, Jamaica-Israel, Mexico-Australia, Mexico-Belgium, Mexico-China, Mexico-Finland, Mexico-
France, Mexico Greece, Mexico-Israel, Mexico-Romania , Mexico-Sweden, Portugal-Algeria, Portugal-
Brazil, Portugal-Bulgaria, Portugal-Cape Verde, Portugal-Canada, Portugal-China, Portugal-Slovakia, 
Portugal-Slovenia, Portugal-Estonia, Portugal-Greece, Portugal-Hungary, Portugal-India, Portugal-
Iceland, Portugal-Latvia, Portugal-Lithuania, Portugal-Luxembourg, Portugal-Macao, Portugal-Malta, 
Portugal-Morocco, Portugal-Pakistan, Portugal-Poland, Portugal-Czech Republic, Portugal-Romania, 
Portugal -Russia, Portugal-Sweden, Portugal-Tunisia, Portugal-Ukraine, Suriname-Indonesia, Uruguay-
Hungary, Venezuela-Austria, Venezuela-Barbados, Venezuela-Belgium, Venezuela-China, Venezuela-
Korea, Venezuela-Denmark, Venezuela-France , Venezuela-Indonesia, Venezuela-Iran, Venezuela-Italy, 
Venezuela Malaysia, Venezuela-Country It is Netherlands, Venezuela-Norway, Venezuela-Portugal, 
Venezuela-Qatar, Venezuela-Czech Republic, Venezuela-Sweden, Venezuela-Trinidad Tobago, 
Venezuela-United Kingdom. The DTCs set out below also follow the 1977 Model but with some deviations: 
Argentina-United Kingdom, Bolivia-France, Bolivia-United Kingdom, Brazil-Ukraine, Chile-Thailand, 
Chile-Malaysia, Cuba-Austria, Cuba-Barbados, Spain-Thailand, Spain-Poland, Spain-Vietnam, Guyana-
United Kingdom, Portugal-Korea, Portugal-Indonesia, Portugal-Singapore, Portugal-Turkey, Venezuela-
 
 
complex forms of business organization at international level, the Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs (which replaced the Fiscal Committee) carried out a revision of the Draft 
Convention of 1963. As a result, a new Model Tax Convention and its Commentaries was 
published in 197727, in which several changes to the wording of Article 26 were made, as 
observed below (marked in bold):  
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information 
as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the domestic 
laws of the Contracting States concerning taxes covered by the Convention insofar as 
the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of information 
is not restricted by Article 1. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be 
treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of 
that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
administrative bodies) involved in the assessment or collection of, the enforcement or 
prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes covered 
by the Convention. Such persons or authorities shall use the information only for such 
purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in judicial 
decisions.  
                                                          
Germany, Venezuela-Kuwait. In particular, all these DTCs restrict the personal scope of application to 
residents of any of the Contracting States. The DTCs Argentina-Canada, Argentina-Russia, Argentina-
Sweden, Venezuela-Canada, Chile-Belgium, Chile-Canada, Chile-Korea, Chile-Croatia, Chile-Denmark, 
Spain-Chile, Peru-Canada, Peru-Chile and all those DTCs concluded by Chile make no reference to the 
prohibition outlined in section 4 of the Article which prevents a Contracting State from providing 
information when there is no domestic interest in it. The DTCs Ecuador-Canada, Ecuador-Chile, Paraguay-
Chile, in addition to the above, establish that information necessary to apply value added taxes might also 
be exchanged. The Mexico-Portugal and Mexico-Denmark DTCs also allow the exchange of information 
on value added taxes. The Argentina-Norway, Chile-Ecuador, Jamaica-United States, Mexico-Japan, 
Mexico-Norway and Chile-Poland DTCs expand the objective scope to taxes of any kind. The Chile-Peru 
DTC specifies that the information exchanged may refer to the taxes included in the Convention and, also, 
the General Sales Tax. Under the coverage of the Chile-Mexico, Venezuela-United States DTCs, 
information on any kind of taxes may be exchanged regardless of these taxes are under the scope of the 
Convention or not. The Cuba-Portugal, Cuba-Qatar, Cuba-Russia Agreements allows the use of the 
information exchanged for purposes other than those provided in the section. The following provision is 
missing in the Convention between Ecuador and Romania: ‘Such persons or authorities shall use the 
information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings or in 
judicial decisions’. The Spain-Cuba DTC notes that the information may only be used in the territories of 
the Contracting States. In the Mexico-Ireland DTC it is established that ‘In the event that the laws of Ireland 
are amended to permit the exchange of information and non-discrimination articles of an existing 
Agreement or Convention concluded by Ireland for the avoidance of double taxation to apply to taxes not 
covered by such Agreement or Convention then the provisions of Articles 23 and 25 of this Convention 
shall also apply to such taxes’. In the Portugal-Netherlands and Suriname-Netherlands Conventions, the 
section concerning the reasons for opposition to the exchange request is missing. Finally, the DTC 
Venezuela-Cuba notes that the information received will not be used for other purposes and that such 
information will only be used in the territories of the Contracting States. 
27 2017 OECD MTC, para. 7.  
 
 
2. In no case shall the provisions, of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on a 
Contracting State the obligation:  
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative 
practice of that or of the other Contracting State; 
b) to supply information which, is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course 
of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;  
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial 
or professional secret or trade process, or information, the disclosure of which would be 
contrary to public policy (ordre public). 
These amendments were the first step in a process of expansion and evolution of Art. 26 
OECD MTC towards a wider-ranging provision28. Thus, since 1977, in addition to the 
exchange of tax information for the application of the Convention, the use of this 
mechanism was also authorized to apply the provisions of domestic legislations of the 
Contracting States, even where such legislation was not related to the DTC29.  
The new version of the Article explicitly stated that ‘the exchange of information is not 
restricted by Article 1’. Thus, not only the objective scope of the clause was expanded 
but also the personal scope by authorizing the exchange of information regarding non-
resident taxpayers of the Contracting States. 
Likewise, the extent of the confidentiality nature of the information was expanded to the 
courts and administrative bodies involved in the assessment, collection, enforcement or 
prosecution of the determination of the taxes covered by the Convention. The disclosure 
of the information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions was also explicitly 
allowed. The autonomous secrecy rule of the 1963 OECD MTC became an ‘equal 
treatment obligation’ under which the requesting State was forced to keep the received 
information secret in the same way as if it had been obtained according to its national 
law. This new rule, which is still applicable nowadays, favored the use of the information; 
however, as a downside, there was a decrease in the level of secrecy protection since it 
was made dependent on the different legal provisions of the Contracting States30. The 
                                                          
28 M. RING, D.: “Article 26: Exchange of Information”, op. cit. p. 10. 
29 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1977, para. 1. 
30 OBERSON, X.: International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global Transparency, 
op. Cit., pp. 24-25 y VOGEL, K., Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions. A Commentary to the 
 
 
applicable penalties in case of violation of the secrecy would also be provided by the 
administrative and criminal legislation of the Contracting States. 
In addition to the changes made in the literal wording of the provision, the Commentaries 
to the Article were also modified. Mainly, in relation to the modalities of the exchange of 
information and the scope of the investigations to be carried out when a request of 
information was made.  
Regarding the former, remember that the Commentaries to Article 26 OECD MTC 1963 
expressed that ‘the rule laid down in paragraph I of the Article presupposes that 
information shall be exchanged only on application’31. As of 1977, this restriction is 
repealed and explicit reference is made to spontaneous and automatic types of exchange32. 
Also, the possibility not to carry out special investigations or special examination of the 
business accounts kept by the taxpayer if the information could not be obtained in the 
normal procedure of tax determination, was eliminated.  
Thus, in line with the tendency to increase the scope of the information exchange clause, 
the Commentaries established the obligation of the requested State to collect the 
information the other State needed ‘in the same way as if its own taxation was involved’33. 
As a consequence of this criteria followed by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
most part of States understood that upon a request for information -based on an DTC 
signed after the 1977 amendment -, the Tax Administration of the requested state was 
forced to use the all the means granted by its domestic legislation to obtain the information 
(principle of national autonomy), including those concerning special investigations, even 
in those cases in which the information exchanged had no interest for the requested 
State34.  
 
                                                          
OECD, UN and US Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and Capital. With 
Particular Reference to German Treaty Practice, op. cit., pp. 1413-1415.   
31 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1977, para. 1. 
32 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1963, para. 7. 
For further information in relation to the types of information exchange see CALDERÓN CARRERO, 
J.M.: Intercambio de información fiscal y fraude fiscal internacional op. cit., p. 123. 
33 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 1977.  
34 CALDERÓN CARRERO, J.M.: Intercambio de información fiscal y fraude fiscal internacional op. cit., 
pp. 134-135 y 142-143. 
 
 
1.3. Phase 3. 2000 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital35. 
With the aim of reducing the obstacles encountered in the practice of exchange of tax 
information between Tax Administrations, the 2000 amendment extended again the 
information exchange clause in the following terms: 
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information 
as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or of the domestic 
laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on behalf of the Contracting 
States, or of their political subdivisions or local authorities, insofar as the taxation 
thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. The exchange of information is not 
restricted by Articles 1 and 2. Any information received by a Contracting State shall be 
treated as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws 
of that State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement 
or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes 
referred to in the first sentence. Such persons or authorities shall use the information 
only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court proceedings 
or in judicial decisions.  
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on a 
Contracting State the obligation:  
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and administrative 
practice of that or of the other Contracting State;  
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal course 
of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;  
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, commercial 
or professional secret or trade process, or information, the disclosure of which would be 
contrary to public policy (ordre public). 
                                                          
35As for September 2017, the DTCs following this Model are: Brazil-Belgium, Brazil-Mexico, Brazil-
Venezuela, Spain-Iran, Spain-Costa Rica, Spain-Macedonia, Spain-New Zealand, Spain-South Africa, 
Spain-Turkey, Mexico -Brazil, Mexico-Russia, Venezuela Russia, Brazil-Chile, Mexico-Czech Republic. 
These last two slightly deviate from the Model. The first limits the objective scope to taxes under the scope 
of the Convention. The second makes no reference to the domestic interest of the Contracting State in 
section 4.  
 
 
Therefore, the main amendment was the extension of the objective scope of the 
information exchange. As of year 2000, under Article 26 OECD MTC, the States, their 
political subdivisions or local authorities can exchange tax-relevant information 
regarding any type of tax, being indifferent that such taxes were included in the scope of 
the DTC. Commentaries to the Article reflected this modification and, at the same time, 
specified that those Contracting States that could not adapt to the change were free to 
maintain the previous version of the Convention36.  
The expansion of the objective scope led to a corresponding increase in the scope of the 
confidentiality right: from that moment on, the information could be communicated both 
to the persons or authorities responsible for the management, collection and inspection of 
taxes covered by the DTC, and also to the persons responsible for the management of the 
taxes out of the scope of the Convention37. Regarding confidentiality, Commentaries to 
the Article clarified that the enumeration of the persons to whom the information provided 
in section 1 of the article could be communicated did not exclude that the same 
information was also disclosed to the taxpayer, his proxy or to the witnesses involved in 
the procedure of determination of appeals38.  
On the other hand, in relation to the modalities of information exchange, Commentaries 
to the Article clarified that they were not restricted to the three conventional forms –that 
is, exchange upon request, automatic or spontaneous- but that Contracting States could 
make use of any other techniques they deemed pertinent to obtain the information, such 
as simultaneous examinations, tax examinations abroad and industry-wide exchange of 
information39. In this sense, reference was made to the publication ‘Tax Information 
Exchange between OECD Member Countries: A Survey of Current Practices’, where the 
techniques were fully described. 
                                                          
36 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2000, para. 1. 
37 In this vein, CALDERÓN CARRERO, J. M. (2004) “El artículo 26 MC OCDE 2000: la cláusula de 
intercambio de información”, /in/ Comentarios a los convenios para evitar la doble imposición y prevenir 
la evasión fiscal concluidos por España (Análisis a la luz del Modelo de Convenio de la OCDE y de la 
legislación y jurisprudencia española), (La Coruña: Instituto de Estudios Económicos de Galicia) pp. 1270-
1276. 
38 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2000, para. 12. 
39 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2000, para. 9.1; For further information in relation to the types of 
information exchange, see ESCALONA RUIZ, M. A. (2010) “Acuerdos internacionales de intercambio de 
información y asistencia mutua”, (Cuadernos de Formación. Colaboración 29/10. Vol. 11/2010 Instituto de 
Estudios Fiscales). 
 
 
1.4. Phase 4. 2005 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital40 
The changing economic conditions and the increasing sophistication and complexity of 
the methods of tax avoidance and evasion exerted a strong pressure that led to a new 
update and adaptation of the Model Tax Convention in 200541. At the same time, the need 
to adapt the content of Article 26 to the current practices among States and to the global 
standard of information exchange was highlighted. In this context, the Model Agreement 
on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters and the Report ‘Improving Access to Bank 
Information for Tax Purposes’ played a prominent role42. 
As a consequence, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs carried out an in-depth review of 
Article 26 in 2002, which resulted in multiple amendments to both the Article and the 
Commentaries of the MTC, as it is transcribed hereunder43: 
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information 
as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or to the 
administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and 
description imposed on behalf of the Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions 
                                                          
40 As for September 2017 this Model is followed by the DTCs: Brazil-Korea, Chile-Australia, Chile-
Austria, Colombia-Canada, Colombia-Czech Republic, Colombia-Korea, Colombia-Portugal, Costa Rica-
Germany, Jamaica-Norway, Jamaica -Sweden, Ecuador-China, Ecuador-Korea, Ecuador-Singapore, 
Ecuador-Uruguay, Spain-Croatia, Spain-United Arab Emirates, Spain-Kazakhstan, Spain-Luxembourg, 
Spain-Malta, Spain-Serbia, Spain-Singapore, Mexico -Bahréin, Mexico-Colombia, Mexico-United Arab 
Emirates, Mexico-Hungary, Mexico-Iceland, Mexico-India, Mexico-Kuwait, Mexico-Latvia, Mexico-
Lithuania, Mexico-Luxembourg, Mexico-Netherlands, Mexico-Qatar, Mexico -New Zealand, Mexico-
United Kingdom, Mexico-South Africa, Mexico-Singapore, Mexico-Turkey, Mexico-Ukraine, Mexico-
Uruguay, Panama-Barbados, Panama-Korea, Panama-United Arab Emirates, Panama-France, Panama-
England, Panama-Ireland, Panama-Luxembourg, Panama-Mexico, Panama-Netherlands, Panama-
Portugal, Panama- Qatar, Panama-Czech Republic, Panama-Singapore, Panama-United Kingdom, Panama- 
Vietnam, Peru-Korea, Portugal-Barbados, Portugal-Sao Tome, Portugal-Vietnam, Portugal-Saudi Arabia, 
Portugal-Croatia, Portugal-Georgia, Portugal-Japan, Portugal-Qatar, Portugal-Sultano de Oman, Portugal-
Ethiopia, Portugal-Kuwait, Portugal-San Marino, Uruguay-Germany, Uruguay-Korea, Uruguay-Ecuador, 
Uruguay- United Arab Emirates, Uruguay-Finland, Uruguay- India, Uruguay-Liechtenstein, Uruguay-
Luxembourg, Uruguay-Malta, Uruguay-Mexico, Uruguay-Portugal, Uruguay-Romania, Uruguay-
Singapore, Uruguay-Vietnam, Venezuela-Belarus, Venezuela-United Arab Emirates, Venezuela-Vietnam. 
The following DTCs also follow this model, but with deviations: for example, the Brazil-Norway, Brazil-
South Africa, Brazil-Turkey DTCs state that the exchange of information covers only federal taxes. On the 
other hand, the Brazil-Peru DTC does not include the possibility to deny the exchange in case of lack of 
domestic interest. The Chile-Colombia DTC lacks section 5. And, finally, the Spain-Hong Kong, Mexico-
Barbados, Mexico-Hong Kong, Panama-Israel, Portugal-Hong Kong, Venezuela-Saudi Arabia 
Conventions limit the objective scope to the taxes covered by the DTC. 
41 2017 OECD MTC, para. 8.  
42 In the same vein, COLLADO YURRITA, M. A. y MORENO GONZÁLEZ, S. (Coord.) Estudios sobre 
Fraude Fiscal e Intercambio Internacional de Información Tributaria; op. cit. pp. 257-274; OBERSON, 
X.: International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global Transparency, op. cit pp. 6-7.  
43 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 4. 
 
 
or local authorities, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. 
The exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2.  
2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State shall be treated 
as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that 
State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement 
or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred 
to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such persons or authorities shall use 
the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court 
proceedings or in judicial decisions.  
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed so as to impose on 
a Contracting State the obligation:  
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and 
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;  
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal 
course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;  
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, 
commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure 
of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).  
4. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, 
the other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain the 
requested information, even though that other State may not need such information for 
its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding sentence is subject to 
the limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such limitations be construed to 
permit a Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because it has no 
domestic interest in such information.  
5. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a Contracting 
State to decline to supply information solely because the information is held by a bank, 
other financial institution, nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary 
capacity or because it relates to ownership interests in a person. 
 
 
The first modification to the Article consisted in the replacement of ‘necessary’ 
information by ‘foreseeably relevant’ information. According to the Commentaries, the 
reason for the terminological change was to standardize the wording with the ‘Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters’. In addition, the standard of 
‘foreseeable relevance’ was intended to provide for exchange of information in tax 
matters to the widest possible extent44. 
Accordingly, Commentaries to Article 26 clarified that the information covered by the 
exchange was not limited to taxpayer-specific information but competent authorities 
could also exchange other sensitive information related to tax administration and 
compliance improvement -for example risk analysis techniques or tax avoidance or 
evasion schemes-45.  
In view of the expansion of the scope of the provision, concern was expressed about the 
possibility that the situation would result in indiscriminate information exchange46. 
Hence, the OECD explicitly rejected the possibility to engage in ‘fishing expeditions’. In 
this sense, the ‘foreseeable relevance’ standard discussed above was set as a limit to this 
type of practice in such a way that speculative requests for information not related to an 
investigation or inspection in process47 or whose relevance in relation to the tax affairs of 
a given taxpayer was unlikely were not allowed48. 
As regards the confidentiality of the information (paragraph 2 of the Article), the 
Commentaries provided for the possibility of adding an additional subsection to 
paragraph 2 allowing Contracting States to use the information for purposes other than 
those established in the Article, but always in accordance with ‘the laws of both States 
and the competent authority of the supplying State’49. 
                                                          
44 In this vein, OBERSON, X.: International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global 
Transparency, op. cit., p. 33. 
45 CALDERÓN CARRERO, on the 1997 OECD MTC, stated that the information exchanged may consist 
both of factual issues and legal relations; for example, data referring to residence period of an individual in 
one of the Contracting States, accounting issues, legal characterization of income, etc. CALDERÓN 
CARRERO, J. M., Intercambio de información y fraude fiscal internacional, op. cit., p. 75.   
46 M. RING, D.: “Article 26: Exchange of Information” op. cit., p.10.  
47 Manual CIAT para la implantación y práctica del intercambio de información para fines tributarios. 
https://www.ciat.org/Biblioteca/DocumentosTecnicos/Espanol/2006_Manual_CIAT_implantacion_Interc
ambio_Informaciones.pdf  15/03/2019. 
48 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 5. 
49 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 12.3.  
 
 
On the other hand, it was noted that, as a guarantee of the taxpayer’s rights, the domestic 
legislation of some countries included procedures to notify the person who provided the 
information and/or the taxpayer that was subject to the enquiry prior to the information 
delivery. However, notification procedures should not be applied in a manner that, in the 
particular circumstances of the request, would frustrate the efforts of the requesting State 
or would unduly delay effective information exchange. Therefore, Commentaries warned 
of the need to introduce exceptions to these procedures. In addition, the obligation of the 
Contracting States to inform their treaty partners about the existence of such procedures 
and its consequences -prior to its signature and thereafter whenever the relevant rules 
were modified- was stressed.  
Likewise, the importance for the requesting State of the form in which the information to 
be exchanged was received was highlighted - for example, for evidentiary purposes -. 
Therefore, the OECD advised that, as long as the form was permitted under its law or 
administrative practice, States should try, as far as possible, to meet such requests50.  
Another modification was made regarding the reasons for opposition to the information 
request. For these purposes, although the wording of section 3 of the article remained 
unchanged, new clarifications were introduced in the Commentaries in respect to the 
feasibility of bank secrecy as an opposition ground.  
As for the provisions in the Commentaries, two major clarifications were introduced. The 
first one sought to make the interpretation of the reciprocity principle more flexible in 
order to prevent the frustration of the effective exchange of information. A iuris tantum 
provision was even added by establishing that ‘it can be assumed that the requested 
information could be obtained by the requesting State in a similar situation if that State 
has not indicated to the contrary’51. The second amendment clarified the extension of the 
secret nature of certain information as an opposition ground for the information request. 
In particular, art. 26.3 c) OECD MTC established that under no circumstance the 
Contracting States were obliged ‘to supply information which would disclose any trade, 
business, industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information 
the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public)’. Given the great 
extent of this provision, the Commentaries clarified that the confidentiality of the 
                                                          
50 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 10.2. 
51 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 10.8. 
 
 
information should not be given a broad sense. That is, confidentiality could only preclude 
the exchange of information when facts and circumstances of great economic importance 
were involved and its disclosure could cause serious damage52.  
As already advanced, one of the main additions to the 2005 version of OECD MTC was 
the incorporation of a new paragraph to the article that was intended to ensure that the 
limitations of paragraph 3 were not used to prevent the exchange of information held by 
banks or other financial institutions. The introduction of section 5 reflected the 
international trend in this area, in particular, the recommendations of the Model 
Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters and the Report ‘Improving 
Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes’53. 
Finally, a fourth paragraph was introduced which explicitly included the principle of 
national autonomy. The principle had already been considered by the OECD since 197754 
and, although it was not specifically mentioned in the wording of Article 26, it was noted 
in the Commentaries to the Convention and most States followed this practice. With the 
amendment in 2005, interpretative discrepancies were avoided as from that moment on 
the obligation to exchange information held by the requested State was established even 
if such exchange could infringe bank secrecy. 
1.5. Phase 5. 2012 update to Article 26 of the OECD MTC55.  
On July 17, 2012, the OECD approved an updated version of Article 26 of the Model Tax 
Convention. The amendments affected both the Article and its Commentaries and, 
                                                          
52 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 29 and 19.2.  
53 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2005, para. 19.1.  
54 Vid. Phase 2. 1977 OECD Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital.  
55 As for September 2017, the DTCs following this Model are: Argentina-Chile, Argentina-Switzerland, 
Chile-China, Chile-Italy, Chile-Japan, Chile-Czech Republic, Colombia-Spain, Colombia-India, Spain-
Albania, Spain- Germany, Spain-Andorra, Spain-Saudi Arabia, Spain-Argentina, Spain-Armenia, Spain-
Barbados, Spain-Bosnia And Herzegovina, Spain-Canada, Spain-Cyprus, Spain-Georgia, Spain-Jamaica, 
Spain-Panama, Spain -Kuwait, Spain-Moldova, Spain-Nigeria, Spain-Oman, Spain-Pakistan, Spain-
Dominican Republic, Spain-United Kingdom, Spain-Senegal, Spain-Uruguay, Spain-Uzbekistan, Mexico-
Austria, Mexico-Estonia, Mexico -Indonesia, Mexico-Malta, Mexico-Peru, Portugal-Cyprus, Portugal-
Ivory Coast, Portugal-Montenegro, Portugal-Peru, Portugal-Senegal, Uruguay-England, Uruguay-United 
Kingdom. The DTCs described below also follow the Model, but with some deviations. In particular, in the 
Brazil-India DTC the information exchanged refers only to federal taxes. As regards the Mexico-
Switzerland, Peru-Switzerland, Uruguay-Switzerland Conventions, the objective scope is limited to the 
taxes covered by the DTC. In addition, most DTCs signed by Spain include the possibility of using the 
information exchanged for other purposes others than those authorized by the Convention.  
 
 
following the trend of the 2011 Oslo Conference on Tax and Crime56, were intended to 
improve the tax information exchange to more effectively fight against tax crimes and 
other criminal activities. After the amendment of 2012 Article 26 was worded as follows:  
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such information 
as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or to the 
administration or enforcement of the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and 
description imposed on behalf of the Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions 
or local authorities, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. 
The exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2.  
2. Any information received under paragraph 1 by a Contracting State shall be treated 
as secret in the same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that 
State and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the enforcement 
or prosecution in respect of, the determination of appeals in relation to the taxes referred 
to in paragraph 1, or the oversight of the above. Such persons or authorities shall use the 
information only for such purposes. They may disclose the information in public court 
proceedings or in judicial decisions. Notwithstanding the foregoing, information 
received by a Contracting State may be used for other purposes when such information 
may be used for such other purposes under the laws of both States and the competent 
authority of the supplying State authorises such use.  
3. In no case shall the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 be construed so as to impose on 
a Contracting State the obligation:  
a) to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and 
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;  
b) to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the normal 
course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting State;  
                                                          
56 OECD (2012) Tax: OECD updates OECD Model Tax Convention to extend information requests to 
groups  
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/taxoecdupdatesoecdmodeltaxconventiontoextendinformationrequeststogr
oups.htm Last accessed: 17/03/2019.  
 
 
c) to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, industrial, 
commercial or professional secret or trade process, or information the disclosure 
of which would be contrary to public policy (ordre public).  
4. If information is requested by a Contracting State in accordance with this Article, the 
other Contracting State shall use its information gathering measures to obtain the 
requested information, even though that other State may not need such information for 
its own tax purposes. The obligation contained in the preceding sentence is subject to the 
limitations of paragraph 3 but in no case shall such limitations be construed to permit a 
Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because it has no domestic 
interest in such information.   
5. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 3 be construed to permit a Contracting 
State to decline to supply information solely because the information is held by a bank, 
other financial institution, nominee or person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity 
or because it relates to ownership interests in a person. 
As reflected, the only variation that took place in 2012 was the introduction of the 
possibility to use the exchanged information for purposes other than those established in 
the second paragraph of the Article57 -provided that such use was in line with the 
legislation of the Contracting States and it was authorized by the requested State-. In 
addition, the requesting State had to specify the intended use of the information and 
demonstrate that its national legislation authorized the exchange under such conditions58.  
Together with the above-mentioned changes, Commentaries were also extended to define 
for the first time the concept of ‘fishing expeditions’ (‘speculative requests that have no 
apparent nexus to an open inquiry or investigation’)59. 
It was provided that, within that standard, both individual requests and group requests 
were included. In the latter case it was more complicated to verify the foreseeable 
relevance of the information and, as a consequence, the State request had to meet certain 
requirements, namely: (i) to provide a detailed description of the group and the specific 
facts and circumstances that had led to the request; (ii) to give an explanation of the 
                                                          
57 Vid. Phase 4. 2005 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital. 
58 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2012, para. 12.3. 
59 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2012, para. 5 in fine. 
 
 
applicable law and why there was reason to believe that the taxpayers in the group for 
whom information was requested had been non-compliant with that law supported by a 
clear factual basis; and (iii) to show that the requested information would assist in 
determining compliance by the taxpayers in the group60. Although the Commentaries 
mentioned these groups’ requests, this has not resulted in a modification of the Article61.  
On the other hand, the Commentaries provided for a voluntary additional wording for 
those States that would like to set specific time limits to carry out the information 
exchange. Specifically, the term varied between 2 and 6 months depending on whether or 
not the Contracting State was already in possession of the requested information. These 
deadlines could be altered by agreement between States and there was even the possibility 
of establishing different ones for specific cases. However, if, due to legal impediments, a 
State could not provide the information within the set deadlines, the temporary 
requirement was not deemed breached. Lastly, the Commentaries established that 
‘provided that the other conditions of this Article are met, information shall be considered 
to have been exchanged in accordance with the provisions of this Article even if it is 
supplied after these time limits’62. 
In addition, it was clarified that a letter requesting information issued by the requesting 
State fell under the scope of the confidentiality right. That is, this letter was secret, 
although some of its information could be disclosed so that the requested State could 
obtain the requested information. Besides, disclosure of such a letter might also be 
imposed by court proceedings. If necessary, the competent authorities could enter into 
specific arrangements regarding the confidentiality of the information exchanged63. 
Regarding the principle of reciprocity, there was the possibility for a State to use measures 
that were not provided for in its domestic legislation or administrative practice. In that 
case, it was entitled to request similar information to the other Contracting State. 
Lastly, States were obliged to use any measure available to obtain the requested 
information, even if it did not have tax interest for the requested State. Besides, there was 
no obligation to provide information in circumstances where a Contracting State had 
                                                          
60 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2012, para. 5.2.  
61 OBERSON, X.: International Exchange of information in tax matters. Towards Global Transparency, 
op. cit., p. 22. 
62 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2012, para. 10.4, 10.5 and 10.6. 
63 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2012, para. 11.  
 
 
attempted to obtain the requested information but found that the information no longer 
existed following the expiration of a domestic record retention period. However, where 
the requested information was still available notwithstanding the expiration of such 
retention period, the requested State could not decline to exchange the information 
available64. 
1.6. Phase 6. 2017 OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
The last update of the OECD Model Tax Convention was endorsed on November 21, 
2017. The aim of this amendment was to incorporate the developments in the field of 
taxation agreed upon the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS). However, this 
version will not be analyzed since no changes were made to Article 26 or its 
Commentaries65.  
 
2. General remarks 
2.1. Art. 26 OECD MTC vs. Art. 26 UN MTC  
The practice of international conventions has been largely influenced by both the OECD 
MTC and the United Nations Model Convention (hereinafter, UN MTC)66 to the extent 
that both Models form the basis of most of the DTCs concluded by States. For this reason, 
the following pages provide an overlook of the main differences between both Models of 
Convention. 
Firstly, it is necessary to stress that both Models share important similarities owing to the 
fact that the OECD Model was taken as a starting point by the UN MTC. Specifically, 
regarding information exchange, the UN MTC reproduces with minor deviations the 
wording of the OECD MTC in force as of 2005. These deviations, although not involving 
substantial disparities, suggest a different approach67.  
                                                          
64 Commentaries to Art. 26 OECD MTC 2012, para. 19.7.  
65 For further information on the amendments introduced by the 2017 OECD MTC: 
https://eycolombia.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/global-tax-alert-oecd-approves-2017-oecd-update.pdf 
Last accessed: 02/07/2019. 
66 https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/MDT_2017.pdf 
67 GARCÍA PRATS, F. A. (2007) “El intercambio de información en el Modelo de Convenio de las 
Naciones Unidas. El artículo 26”, (Documentos IEF, No. 3/2007) p. 22:  
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan002459.pdf    
 
 
The first substantial deviation of the UN MTC lies in the explicit reference to the anti-
avoidance purpose of the clause set as follows: ‘in particular, information shall be 
exchanged that would be helpful to a Contracting State in preventing avoidance or 
evasion of such taxes’. Therewith, the will to use the mechanism of information exchange 
as an instrument in the fight against tax fraud and evasion becomes evident in the UN 
MTC -without altering the interpretation of the DTCs based on the OECD MTC-68.  
On the other hand, the possibility of using the information for purposes other than those 
described in section 2 of art. 26 is not included in the UN MTC. Note that this competence 
was incorporated in the 2012 version of the Article 26 OECD MTC. 
Finally, the following additional section is contained in the UN MTC: ‘The competent 
authorities shall, through consultation, develop appropriate methods and techniques 
concerning the matters in respect of which exchanges of information under paragraph 1 
shall be made’. Thus, the importance of competent authorities in the application of the 
information exchange provisions is emphasized69. 
 
2.2. The progressive development of Article 26 OECD MTC: the imbalance between 
information exchange powers and the taxpayers’ rights and guarantees.  
As shown above, since the approval of the 1963 Draft Convention, the exchange of tax 
information procedure of Article 26 MC OECD has undergone substantial changes. 
Originally, the clause was configured with the sole purpose of solving the problems 
arising from international double taxation in a context of growing cooperation among 
OECD Member States. As a consequence of this sole objective, the clause was restricted 
to the exchange of information regarding taxes under the scope of the DTC and persons 
residing in any of the Contracting States (minimum clause).  
                                                          
Last accessed: 20/03/2019. 
In the same vein, VOGEL K.: Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, Third Edition, A Commentary 
to the OECD, UN and U.S. Model Conventions for the Avoidance of Double Taxation of Income and 
Capital, With Particular Reference to German Treaty Practice, op. cit., p. 1402. 
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The gradual economic and financial globalization resulted in an increase and 
sophistication of tax avoidance and evasion arrangements. In this changing context, the 
importance of information exchange between Tax Administrations as an effective 
instrument of tax control in cross-border operations was highlighted70.   
In order to address the needs emerging in the globalization era, the OECD gradually 
adapted the content and extension of Art. 26 OECD MTC until it was finally erected as a 
wider-ranging provision. Thus, under the scope of the latest versions of the OECD MTC 
it is possible to exchange information in relation to taxes of any kind and regardless of 
whether or not the taxpayer is a resident of the Contracting States. Likewise, restrictions 
on the exchange of information were eliminated and the Commentaries provided for an 
interpretation focused on the widest possible exchange. As a result, Article 26 legally 
empowers the exchange of information between States, providing an instrument which 
guarantees compliance with tax obligations of taxpayers at transnational level. 
Nevertheless, the development of Article 26 with the aim of fighting tax avoidance and 
evasion has led to an unbalanced relationship between the exchange of information 
procedure and the taxpayers’ rights and guarantees. 
The protection of the rights of taxpayers affected by such exchange is regulated partially 
and indirectly not only in the OECD MTC, but also in the majority of international 
instruments that serve as the basis for the exchange71. Thus, despite the fact information 
exchange limits are set and certain guarantees regarding the collection and use of the 
exchanged information are established, there is no specific recognition of subjective 
rights72. As an example, limitations of article 26 (3) MC OECD can be mentioned; these 
restrictions cover situations in which the exchange of information is discretionary for the 
States, but where the taxpayer has no say73. Thus, national legislations are responsible for 
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the regulation of the role of taxpayers in the exchange procedure, which undermines their 
guarantees74.  
In any case, the legal protection of taxpayers and the effectiveness of the information 
exchange must be balanced75. In this regard, Commentaries to Art. 26 provide for the 
possibility that national legislations grant notification rights to the taxpayers affected by 
the exchange procedure. However, at the same time it is maintained that these rights 
cannot frustrate or unduly prevent the effective exchange of information and, in this line, 
recommendations on the establishment of exceptions of such rights are made76. 
In fact, one of the reasons for the scarce regulation of the taxpayers’ rights is that in the 
balancing between both interests - the fight against tax fraud and the taxpayer’s 
guarantees - the former has been given primacy. Also, the aforementioned deregulation 
is argued to be linked to the fact that the exchange procedure takes States, and not people, 
as its reference77. 
In a nutshell, the concern for the rights of the taxpayer affected by the exchange of 
information arose in recent times and it is widespread78.  However, as evidenced, Article 
26 OECD MTC has evolved in a way that the exchange of tax information has been 
increased and improved while the rights of the taxpayer have been disregarded.  
 
2.3. The obsolescence of DTCs in the Latin American context and the application of the 
most-favoured-nation principle.  
Not all DTCs concluded by States have adapted to the amendments of the information 
exchange clause introduced in the different versions of the OECD Model Tax 
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Convention, which implies that such modifications are not really effective79.  At this point 
it should not be forgotten that the Model Tax Convention is not a binding norm, but has 
a purely suggestive nature80. Therefore, changes to the MTC are not directly applicable 
to DTCs based on a specific version of the Model as long as no amendments are made81. 
In general, this situation of obsolescence can be observed in the DTCs network of Ibero-
American countries. Not many States have adapted to the latest version of the OECD 
MTC, but rather most part of them follow the 1977 Model - in which the exchange of 
information was limited to taxes under the scope of the Convention and no reference was 
made to the fourth and fifth sections of the current provision-.  
Therefore, it is necessary to establish effective mechanisms to incorporate in the different 
DTCs the amendments to the OECD MTC. Given the large number of DTCs and the 
possibility of further changes in the MTC, this process is difficult to carry out if addressed 
Convention by Convention. As a solution, the application of the most-favored-nation 
treatment to DTCs can be considered. By the adoption of this principle, the terms of 
existing Conventions can be modified, thus allowing their adaptation to the constant 
changes in the field of information exchange. 
A most-favored-nation clause requires a country to provide any concessions, privileges, 
or immunities granted to one nation in a Convention to all other Member States. Thus, 
whenever any of the Contracting States concludes with another State a DTC in which the 
exchange of information is more comprehensive and effective in the fight against tax 
fraud, the terms agreed in this will apply to all other Member States.  
This brings nothing new to the table since it had already been introduced in several 
Conventions. As an example, the Switzerland-Spain DTC from 2006 on states: “Should 
Switzerland conclude with a Member State of the European Union, in relation to 
exchange of information, any Agreement of whatever kind and nature or any 6 provision 
in a Double Taxation Agreement, related to taxes covered by this Convention, Switzerland 
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shall give to Spain the same level of co-operation as in such Agreement or provision or 
the part of them and Spain will act accordingly”.  This principle has had as a result that 
the exchange of information clause as concluded in the Conventions signed between 
Switzerland-France and Switzerland- The Netherlands also affects the DTC signed with 
Spain - specifically, as regards to the time scope of application-82. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE DTC NETWORK OF IBEROAMERICAN COUNTRIES. 
1. Issues arising from the objective scope of application.  
1.1. Foreesably relevant information. 
As stated above, Article 26 OECD MTC compels to exchange information that is deemed 
to be foreseeably relevant for the successful implementation of the DTC and the tax 
regulations of the requesting State. In this way, the foreseeable relevance standard is 
established as a necessary requirement for the exchange to be mandatory and the 
provision to apply. 
The notion of ‘foreseeable relevance’ constitutes an undefined legal concept and, 
consequently, the exchange will rely on the more or less strict interpretation of the notion 
carried out by each State83. In order to avoid inconsistent interpretations certain 
explanatory provisions were introduced in the Commentaries to Article 26. 
Thus, it is intended that the exchange of information is carried out as widely as possible, 
provided there is a reasonable possibility that the requested information is relevant. This 
possibility must exist at the time the request is made, regardless of whether the 
information is finally relevant. In other words, the exchange information cannot be 
refused in those cases in which the relevant nature of the information is verified once the 
requesting State has received the data84.  
The Tax Authority carrying out the investigation that gives rise to the request will assess 
the relevance of the information85. Consequently, provided that such relevance has been 
justified, the requested State cannot refuse the request for information even if it is 
understood that the foreseeable relevance criterion is not met86.  
Nonetheless, Article 26 is not applicable to ‘fishing expeditions’, that is, speculative 
requests that have no apparent nexus to an open inquiry or investigation. This is reflected 
in the Commentaries to the Model Convention, whose provisions have been accepted by 
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the European Union Court of Justice. As an example it can be mentioned the Berlioz Case 
(ECJ 2017\105) where the ECJ stated that ‘According to the commentary on that article 
adopted by the OECD Council on 17 July 2012, Contracting States are not at liberty ‘to 
engage in fishing expeditions’, nor to request information that is unlikely to be relevant 
to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer. On the contrary, there must be a reasonable 
possibility that the requested information will be relevant’87.  However, the request cannot 
be considered as a generic investigation merely on the ground of not having identified the 
name or address of the taxpayer88. 
Similarly, a considerable number of States have referenced to the ‘foreseeable relevance’ 
standard and the concept of ‘fishing expeditions’ in their DTCs. In this regard, mention 
can be made to the DTCs concluded by Panama since all of them limit the exchange of 
information by the application of the foreseeable relevance standard. Thus, mainly two 
different versions of the clause are adopted:  
(i) The first wording states the following: ‘It is understood that the 
administrative assistance provided for in Article 25 does not include (i) 
measures aimed only at the simple collection of pieces of evidence, or (ii) 
when it is improbable that the requested information will be relevant for 
controlling or administering tax matters of a given taxpayer in a 
Contracting State (“fishing expeditions”)’.  
Panama-Barbados, Panama-Korea, Panama-Arab Emirates, Panama-Spain, 
Panama-Luxembourg, Panama-Mexico, Panama-Netherlands, Panama-
Portugal and Panama-Qatar DTC have adopted this versión of the clause.  
(ii) The second version is aligned to the recommendations of the OECD MTC 
as follows: ‘the reference to “foreseeably relevant” information is intended 
to provide for exchange of information in tax matters to the widest possible 
extent, though Contracting States are not at liberty to request information 
that is unlikely to be relevant to the tax affairs of a given taxpayer (“fishing 
expeditions”)’.  
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This version is followed by the DTCs Panama-France, Panama-Ireland, 
Panama-United Kingdom and Panama-Vietnam.  
The second version is also used, with minimal differences, in the DTCs signed by Spain-
Andorra, Portugal-Andorra, Argentina-Switzerland and Peru-Switzerland. 
Some other DTCs deal only briefly with these issues, by establishing that the exchange 
provided for in the Article does not cover speculative and general requests. In addition, 
although some directly forbid the so-called fishing expeditions, an autonomous definition 
of such concept is not set. This is drawn from the following DTCs: Panama-Israel, 
Panama-Czech Republic, Mexico-Switzerland, Uruguay-Arab Emirates, Uruguay-
Finland, Uruguay-Luxembourg, Uruguay-Switzerland, Spain-Netherlands and Portugal-
Hong Kong. 
On the other hand, the DTC concluded between Chile and Switzerland has a different 
wording, since it relates the foreseeable relevance requirement to tax fraud. Specifically, 
it is established that the requested State must provide information to the extent that the 
requesting State has a well-founded suspicion that a tax fraud is being carried out. 
However, it is clarified that this provision does not justify fishing expeditions. 
Finally, as noted above, the requesting State is responsible for the assessment of the 
relevance requirement89. However, the requested State may exercise some control in this 
regard, by demanding a series of procedural requirements to ensure that generic 
investigations are not carried out. 
These requirements are basically informative demands. In this regard, most of the DTCs 
referred to above set the obligation of the requesting State to provide, together with the 
request for information, certain additional information such as the identity of the person 
under examination or investigation; the tax purpose for which the information is sought; 
grounds for believing that the information requested is held in the requested State, etc. 
Portugal-Cyprus and Panama-Singapore DTCs highlight the purpose of such obligation: 
‘The competent authority of the applicant State shall provide the following information 
to the competent authority of the requested State when making a request for information 
under the Agreement to demonstrate the foreseeable relevance of the information to the 
request’.  
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1.2. Types of exchange of information. 
Currently, Contracting States are free to choose any type of exchange: upon request, 
automatic or spontaneous. Thus, one type of exchange or another does not involve 
different consequences with respect to the mandatory nature of the procedure90. Before 
analyzing the DTCs network of Latin American countries, it is necessary to make a brief 
reference to the particularities of these three types of exchange. 
The information exchange upon request is established as the most commonly used method 
to exchange information under Article 2691. Under this modality, a Contracting State 
provides, on request, foreseeably relevant information for carrying out the provisions of 
a tax convention or for the administration or enforcement of the domestic tax laws of a 
requesting party92. 
On the other hand, through automatic exchange of information, Tax Administrations must 
communicate certain categories of information in a systematic and periodic way. In this 
way, the high costs generated by the requesting States in the identification of the specific 
operator for which information is requested are avoided93.  
Finally, spontaneous exchange of information is the provision of information to another 
contracting party that is foreseeably relevant to that other party and that has not been 
previously requested94. 
Having compared the three types of information exchange, it is necessary to examine the 
Ibero-American network of DTCs.  
In the first place, it must be noted that the modalities by which information can be 
exchanged under the coverage of art. 26 OECD MTC have undergone multiple changes 
since 1963. In this sense, if DTCs concluded after the 1963 OECD MTC are interpreted 
in light of the original Commentaries to Art. 26, exchange information upon request 
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would be the only modality allowed95. However, most part of States have accepted as 
valid the majority of automatic and spontaneous exchanges based on the DTCs prior to 
1977 -date on which the restriction was removed-96.  
Regardless of the amendments made to the Commentaries - whose impact varies from 
States - from the analysis of the DTC network, it can be concluded that a large part of the 
Conventions limit the modalities of exchange.  
Thus, there are DTCs that only establish as mandatory the exchange of information upon 
request, being optional the use of automatic or spontaneous exchanges. Such is the case 
of the following DTCs: Ecuador-China, Mexico-Hong Kong, Mexico-Switzerland, 
Uruguay-Finland, Uruguay-Liechtenstein, Uruguay-Switzerland, Portugal-Hong Kong, 
Peru-Switzerland, Argentina-Switzerland, Chile-Austria and all those concluded by 
Panama97. 
On the contrary, the information exchange under the DTCs signed by Spain with Andorra, 
the United States, France and Morocco will take place either automatically or to meet 
requests regarding specific cases. This requires that the contracting States reach an 
agreement in order to determine the information that must be provided ex officio. 
Likewise, the Double Taxation Convention between Spain and Estonia clarifies that the 
expression “information obtainable under the laws or in the normal course of 
administration” includes information automatically submitted to the tax authorities and 
information obtainable upon request of the tax authorities as stated in the domestic law98. 
In relation to the third of the modalities of exchange, reference to spontaneous exchange 
is made in the Mexico-Russia and Portugal-Brazil DTCs as follows: ‘It is understood that 
in accordance with the provisions of this Article the competent authority of a Contracting 
State shall spontaneously transmit to the competent authority of the other State 
information which has come to the attention of the first-mentioned State and which is 
likely to be relevant to, and bear significantly on, accomplishment of the purposes 
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referred to in paragraph 1. The competent authorities shall determine the information to 
be exchanged pursuant to this paragraph and take such measures and implement such 
procedures as are necessary to ensure that the information is forwarded to the competent 
authority of the other State’. 
 
2. Admissibility of information that has been collected unlawfully. 
2.1. Introductory remarks. 
As a result of the case-law on the Hervé Falciani case, the legal admissibility of 
information obtained illegally has been questioned. This case has given States the 
opportunity to express their views on the validity as evidence of information with tax 
significance that, although being obtained with violation of fundamental rights, has 
subsequently been provided to other States respecting the legal requirements of 
cooperation mechanisms. Hence, the illicitly obtained information has subsequently been 
incorporated to the proceedings in full respect of the applicable law, and is thus to be 
considered admissible evidence from a strictly procedural perspective. More 
controversial is the legitimacy of evidence whose collection has violated fundamental 
rights in the source country99.   
To address this issue, reference should be made to the solutions given in comparative law 
(including the case of Spain), especially since this situation has not been expressly 
regulated in international information exchange instruments100. 
In this sense, it should be recalled that art. 26 OECD MTC establishes as an opposition 
ground to the request for information the use of administrative practices contrary to the 
legislation or practice of any of the Contracting States. Also, the required State cannot be 
compelled to exchange information whose communication is contrary to the ordre public. 
These provisions may be of interest in the assumption that the data subject to the request 
for information has been stolen or obtained illegally, thus violating the public order of 
any of the States. 
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However, if any of the aforementioned situations arise, nothing restricts the exchange of 
information but in such a case compliance with the request is discretionary. That is, art. 
26 OECD MTC does not preclude the exchange of information obtained illegally, so 
States, based on their national legislation, will decide on the legal value of such data101.  
Regarding to the invalidity of the evidence, the States’ procedural systems are built from 
shared but not always convergent structural principles. In addition, these principles have 
undergone considerable evolution over the years102. The reasoning of the Falciani List 
case constitutes a further step in this regard and demonstrates the prevalence of 
constitutional interests over the fundamental right affected when obtaining the evidence. 
In order to offer a helpful overlook of the issue, it is essential to make a brief reference to 
trends followed by the scholars. Subsequently, case-law on the theft of information from 
tax evaders by an employee of a bank and then provided to tax authorities will be 
examined. Specifically, an analysis of the Liechtenstein Group case and the Falciani List 
case will be made. 
 
2.2. Exchange of illegally obtained information.  
Originally, evidence acquired in violation of rights was excluded from the information 
exchange procedure since it was understood that material facts could not be obtained at 
any price. However, both American and European Law have moderated the consequences 
resulting from this assessment of the illegality of the evidence103. 
The doctrine of exclusion of unlawful evidence was first applied by US case-law in the 
Boyd v. case US (1886)104. In this regard, the Weeks vs. US case of February 24, 1914105, 
where the admissibility of evidence obtained in a search without judicial permission was 
denied as it was understood to be contrary to the IV amendment, is also significant. This 
trend was completed by the United States Supreme Court decision on the Silverthorne 
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Lumber co. Vs. US (1920) case106, which gave rise to what is known as the ‘doctrine of 
the fruit of the poisoned tree’. The logic of such doctrine is that if the source of the 
evidence or the evidence itself is tainted, then anything obtained from it is tainted as 
well107. 
The case-law that followed settled certain limits to the exclusion of unlawful evidence, 
making the application of the above-mentioned doctrine more flexible. In this way, the 
inadmissibility of the evidence was disconnected from the violation of the rights of 
individuals shifting the focus of the exclusion to a more dissuasive purpose for public 
authorities. Over time, major exceptions to the illegality of the evidence were introduced, 
such as the theory of good faith, of the independent source, and the weighting of social 
costs108.  
The US progressive development of the legal consequences derived from the illegality of 
the evidence has greatly influenced the comparative case-law. Different countries have 
formulated doctrines aimed at solving the inconveniences of the excessive rigidity of the 
exclusion rule. As can be seen below, the evolution of these doctrines has been quite 
similar.  
In relation to Portuguese law, the inadmissibility of evidence whose collection has 
undermined fundamental rights is constitutionally protected (art. 32 of the 1976 
Constitution). The theory of the fruits of the poisoned tree is sometimes applied in this 
country, although the result is based on a case-by-case basis109. This has also been the 
case with Mexico and Colombia, where the thesis of the reflected effect was balanced 
with the criterion of proportionality110.  
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Concerning Spain, the first decision that addressed this issue was the Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court no. 114/1984111. At first, the Court established the complete 
inadmissibility of any public or private act that directly or indirectly infringed any 
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. This case-law was largely inspired by 
the theory of the fruits of the poisoned tree and was subsequently reflected in the national 
legislation (e.g. article 11 LOPJ). The following jurisprudential developments, in line 
with the European trend, limited the effects derived from information obtained in 
violation of fundamental rights. This was the view taken by the Spanish Supreme Court 
in its decision no. 228/2017, April 3112 which, for the first time, founded the rule of 
exclusion in the superior -but not absolute- value of the fundamental rights113. 
Finally, the theory of the spheres built by the German Highest Court deserves special 
attention. In this State there is no constitutional principle that rejects illegally obtained 
evidence, but it is instead a question of fact to be appreciated by the judge in each case. In 
this way, evidence is only declared inadmissible in cases in which the sphere or the core 
of a fundamental right has been undermined. On the contrary, if the action did not affect 
essential features of the right, the Court must balance the seriousness of the crime, the 
far-reaching interference in the law and the interests at stake114.   
These exceptions to the theory of exclusion were used to determine the probative value 
of bank documents that, even though illegally stolen, were conclusive to substantiate a 
conviction. This will be seen, in the case of the Liechtenstein Group in Germany, and the 
case of the Falciani List in France, Italy and Spain. 
The ruling of the German Constitutional Court in the Liechtenstein Global Trust Treuhad 
AG case (LGT case)115, arises from the data theft from the LGT Group by a former 
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employee (Heinrich Keiber). This information, which was sold to the German Federal 
Intelligence Services, uncovered thousands of possible tax evasion cases and served as a 
starting point for criminal investigations. The validity of the criminal proceedings was 
challenged on the grounds that the unlawfully obtained evidence was also tainting the 
next procedural steps.  
In the decision of the German High Court, the illegality of the evidence was rejected by 
the application of the theory of the spheres. In particular, it was considered that the data 
from Liechtenstein was of an economic nature and therefore it was not covered by the 
essential core of the right to privacy. In addition, despite that due to such information the 
criminal proceedings were initiated, the rest of the evidence was validly generated in the 
proceeding, so there was no deliberate and serious breach of procedure rules116. 
This case reached the European Court of Human Rights, which on October 6, 2016 ruled 
in favor of the legality of the house search as it was considered in line with the principle 
of proportionality. It was understood that such action respected German regulations and 
was necessary for the protection of common interests, especially considering that tax 
evasion represents a serious threat on general interests117.  
The possibility of using unlawfully stolen bank documents and accounting files has also 
been analyzed by the judicial bodies of different countries on the occasion of the Falciani 
List case. Most of these decisions have concluded not to rule out such evidence and those 
responsible have been convicted as perpetrators of tax crimes. 
The events that gave rise to the dispute date back to 2008, when Hervé Falciani, having 
taken advantage of his position as a computer technician at one of the branches of the 
HBSC financial institution, subtracted sensitive information from multiple clients of the 
entity and communicated it to the French authorities. 
As a result of the information leak, the French judicial authorities allowed home searches 
with the aim of collecting reliable evidence of tax fraud crimes. On February 8, 2011, the 
Paris Court of Appeal issued a decision which compelled to nullify the audits as a result 
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of the polluting effect of the stolen information. This ruling was appealed and upheld by 
the French Court of Cassation in a judgment of January 31, 2012118. 
Nonetheless, a more recent judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the French Court of 
Cassation of November 27, 2013 declared the validity as evidence of these documents 
since they had been up for discussion and public authorities had played no role in its 
collection119.  
The impact of the Falciani case went beyond the French borders as the data was supplied 
to multiple countries -among which were Spain and Italy- through international 
cooperation instruments. This situation was exploited in some of the court decisions to 
justify the validity of the evidence. In this sense, it cannot be denied that in these cases 
the infringement to privacy is less directly tied to the illegal evidence as first there is a 
house search by the French authorities and, subsequently, the information is 
communicated to Spain and Italy120.  
Regarding Italy, court decisions have reached different solutions, although, finally, the 
Italian Court of Cassation did not exclude the validity of the information collected form 
the Falciani List - neither in criminal nor in tax proceedings-. 
In the criminal field, the Court argued the lack of conclusive data arising from the theft 
and emphasized that the receipt of the files was carried out under the scope of the 
international regulations of exchange of tax information121.  At a later time, it was added 
that the use of information obtained illegally was legitimate as the start of subsequent 
investigation procedures122.  
In the area of taxation, the Court established that the effects of the evidence obtained 
illegally in the criminal and in the tax proceedings were different. In this sense, it was 
noted that in the tax field there was no rule providing specifically - as does the Criminal 
Procedure Code (art. 191) - the prohibition of the use of illegally obtained evidence, 
except for the cases in which constitutional rights were infringed. Therefore, the Court 
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concluded by declaring that banking information, which had been acquired by an 
employee of a banking institution, could be used in the procedure, being irrelevant 
whether or not that same employee had obtained the data in violation of the right to 
confidentiality123.  
In the case of Spain, Court decisions on this issue have declared that the bank files of the 
Swiss entity HSBC were not affected by the exclusion rule, but had to be treated as a valid 
evidence. However, arguments were different and this issue was finally decided by the 
Spanish High Court ruling no. 116/2017, of February 23 and the Constitutional Court 
ruling of July 16, 2019124. 
Until the High Court decision, Spanish courts based their rulings on the fact that the 
exchange of information - under art. 27 of the France-Spain DTC- was adjusted to law. 
As a consequence, the validity of the evidence was accepted, since it was understood that 
Spanish Courts could not be required to perform legality controls on actions carried out 
beyond its borders125. In addition, it was considered that the duty to contribute to public 
expenses -art. 31 Spanish Constitution- prevailed over the right to privacy affected by the 
use of the data. As a result, the evidence was lawful and sufficient to set aside the right to 
presumption of innocence126.  Another argument was based on the fact that, unlike 
Switzerland, the facts committed by Mr. Falciani did not to amount to a criminal offence 
under Spanish law127. 
The case reached the Supreme Court, which, in a judgment dated February 23, 2017, 
affirmed the probative value of the stolen information. In reaching this conclusion, it took 
into consideration the decisions ruled in comparative law, highlighting the impossibility 
of using identical solutions. This results from the fact that European procedural systems 
are not in all cases convergent in relation to the definition and extent of illegal evidence128. 
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The line of reasoning is innovative with respect to previous case-law, which had aligned 
with the American approach (deterrence of police misconduct)129. 
Thus, for the Court, the rationale of the individual for stealing evidence is not decisive 
when assessing the validity of evidence obtained in detriment of a fundamental right. But 
the demonstration that this person has never, directly or indirectly,  acted on behalf of the 
State in the service of criminal investigations, is conclusive130.  
Then, in order to prevent abuses that may result from misapplication of this approach, the 
Court states that this does not constitute an absolute and general principle. For this reason, 
a second valuation element is added, namely, the balancing of the interests at stake in 
every particular case. This way, it is established that peripheral infringements cannot be 
treated in the same way as those that compromise the very core of a fundamental right -
thus approaching the German theory of the spheres-. 
Analyzing the particular case in the light of this doctrine, it is concluded that no 
connection between Hervé Falciani with Spanish or foreign police services could be 
demonstrated and, consequently, the use of bank files as evidence was accepted131.  
This decision has been reflected in the next judicial pronouncements on the case as the 
judgment no. 512/2017, of September 5, of the Provincial Court of Madrid; the judgment 
No. 311/2018, of June 27 of the Spanish High Court; and the judgment No. 54/2019, of 
February 29 (RJ 2019/287) of the Spanish High Court. If the development of Spanish 
case-law is analyzed, it can be observed that the purpose not to admit illegal information 
as evidence has been progressively separated from the protection of fundamental rights, 
with the exception of the police excessive force cases (e.g. judgment of the Spanish High 
Court No. 116/2017, of February 23)132. 
Even so, the admissibility of the evidence obtained illegally cannot be based exclusively 
on the fact that it has been collected by a private individual unrelated to the state powers, 
as this can foster contacts between public and private organizations, with the purpose that 
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the latter collect incriminating evidence. The challenge of this situation would entail a 
difficult burden of proof for the defender133.  
These conclusions have been addressed by the Spanish Constitutional Court in a judgment 
of July 16, 2019, where the adequacy of the solution adopted by the High Court in the 
above-mentioned decision was analyzed in light of the constitutional requirements arising 
from article 24.2 of the Spanish Constitution (right to a fair trial).  
In brief, the Court understands that the violation of a fundamental right - in this case the 
right to privacy - when obtaining evidence, does not automatically entail its exclusion 
from the body of evidence, but that a balancing judgment between the interests at stake 
must be carried out. The fact that the infringement has been committed by an individual 
does not change at all the constitutional protection standard applicable from the 
perspective of the right to fair trial134.  
However, this circumstance is taken into account to assess the nature and characteristics 
of the violation of the fundamental right. In this sense, it is affirmed that the right to 
privacy of the clients of the banking entity is adequately protected in the criminal or civil 
proceedings arisen in the country where the fundamental right was violated. Since there 
is no connection between these proceedings and the Spanish ones, there is no need for 
greater protection of privacy within this procedure. 
From standpoint of the violation of the fundamental right, the stolen data are related to 
harmless aspects of economic privacy, therefore, it cannot be affirmed that such 
infringement is of sufficient gravity as the evidence is dismissed. In support of this 
argument, it is added that the breach of privacy has taken place beyond Spanish borders 
and solely in cases where the right is indivisibly linked to the inherent dignity of the 
individual a universal protection is granted (judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court 
no. 91/2000, of March 30 (RTC 2000, 91))135. 
Finally, given that in Spain public powers do not protect bank opacity actions, it is 
considered that there is no risk of promoting practices among individuals that violate 
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fundamental rights. On the contrary, the collection of bank information by the authorities 
for tax or criminal investigations is provided by law. 
Taking into account the foregoing, the Spanish Constitutional Court dismisses the appeal 
considering that the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence –article 24 
Spanish Constitutional Act- have not been infringed.  
 
3. Issues arising from the grounds for opposition to the information request. 
The principles of public order, reciprocity and proportionality, as well as the secret nature 
of certain information, are set as limits to the fulfillment of tax justice136. Therefore, the 
mandatory exchange of tax information ex art. 26 OECD MTC declines when any of the 
assumptions provided in the aforementioned provision are met.  
Under these circumstances, the requested State is free to refuse the request of information, 
although nothing prevents it from being carried out. On the contrary, to the extent that 
such exchange is protected by the national regulations137, the requested information can 
be provided as the information exchange falls under the scope of Article 26 OECD MTC 
and the secrecy right is not breached138.  
A case of special interest occurs when the information requested contains business or 
industrial secrets. In such a case, article 26 (3) exempts the provision of information as 
long as the exchange of information may reveal business, industrial or professional 
secrets. The purpose of this provision is to safeguard the technical, industrial and 
commercial knowledge of the taxpayer and the required country in order to protect 
productivity in the face of increasingly tough competition139.  
The Model Tax Convention does not define the concept of business or industrial secrecy 
or the circumstances that must be taken into account when assessing them, but it only 
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restricts its interpretation and value according to the economic importance and the gravity 
of the damage that the disclosure may entail. Specifically, Commentaries to art. 26 of the 
Model refer to business secret as follows: ‘A trade or business secret or trade process is 
generally understood to mean information which has considerable economic importance 
and which can be exploited practically and the unauthorized use of which may lead to 
serious damage (e.g. may lead to severe financial hardship)’. This might happen, for 
instance, in information requests that involve the revelation of the methods of 
manufacturing goods or marketing formulas140. In such cases, the data protected by 
business secret and the remaining financial information must be separated141.  
Because of the lack of precision of these provisions, it is the States that must establish the 
specific content of this opposition ground. The lack of uniformity in the definition of 
these concepts at a national level makes the extent of the information exchanged to be 
different in each State, which, according to certain authors, can preclude the principle of 
reciprocity142 and the confidentiality right143.  
Given this uniformity, the OECD recommends not to interpret the concept of secrecy too 
broadly; otherwise, in many cases the exchange of information would result 
ineffective144. In addition, it points out that the security of trade secrets is to some extent 
guaranteed by the obligation of confidentiality provided for in Article 26 (2) MC OECD 
which prevents the information exchanged from being used for unauthorized purposes145. 
Again, there is a clear aim of expanding the scope of the information exchange at the 
expense of the protection of taxpayers’ rights and guarantees. In this case, the imbalance 
is, if possible, even more relevant, since such an infringement of rights is hardly going to 
be compensated ex post (e.g. the revelation of trade or industrial secrets to third-party 
competitors). 
The difficulty of assessing whether trade secrecy prevails over other constitutionally 
protected interests has been obvious for a long time. As an example, the Bavaria, S.A. 
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case, where Colombian Courts understood differently the protection of industrial secret, 
may be cited.  
The dispute in the main proceedings arises from the request by the Chief of Supervision 
of Large Taxpayers of Bogotá to Bavaria S.A. of certain data, among which was the 
formula of beers and malts manufactured by the entity. In the opinion of the company, 
this information constituted an industrial secret and its disclosure would be equivalent to 
the loss of property. 
The Court understood that the industrial property right is of a fundamental nature because 
it amounts to the assets of the company. It was noted that in the case, the Administration 
exceeded the limits of its competence as the required data had no relevance for the tax 
investigation and was especially sensitive in the current market economy that entails a 
production fueled by high competition. For this reason, the formulas, techniques, systems 
or strategies to produce and the marketing products or services acquire a great importance 
for entrepreneur, who strives to preserve them with a certain stealth because to a large 
extent the success and survival in the market depend on them146. Accordingly, the claims 
submitted at first instance were upheld. 
This case reached the Constitutional Court of Colombia, which overturned this decision, 
stating that Bavaria, S.A. was not required to reveal any industrial secrets, nor was his 
right to industrial property violated. For the Court, this secrecy is limited by the priority 
of the general interest and, as a consequence, favoring industrial property over the regular 
exercise of public functions -as inspection, surveillance, intervention or search for judicial 
evidence-, implies distorting such right147. 
The Aloe Vera vs. United States case also demands particular attention in this regard148.  
The dispute in the main proceedings arises from the claim for damages raised by Aloe 
Vera, an American company which manufactured and sold aloe vera gels to its affiliated 
company in Japan (among other countries). In 1996, Aloe Vera was subject to a tax 
inspection by the US authorities and as a result it revealed that both companies had not 
declared 32 million dollars. Such information was transmitted, based on art. 26 of the 
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Japan-USA DTC, to Japan where it was leaked by the media. However, the exchanged 
information was partially false and serious reputational damage was caused to the 
company. As a result of these events, Aloe Vera filed a claim for damages and requested 
recognition of a violation of its right to confidentiality. 
Finally, the Court understood that the United States exchanged such information despite 
the lack of sufficient data to prove its veracity, which was contrary to both US regulations 
and Article 26 DTC; Therefore, it concludes by establishing the responsibility of the US 
and its obligation to compensate the damages caused to Aloe Vera. 
One of the arguments accepted by the judge - which takes special interest in relation to 
the obligation of secrecy - refers to the possibility of imposing sanctions in cases where 
the transmitting State provides information to a State in which it is known that there is no 
compliance with the obligation of secrecy imposed by article 26 DTC. 
Specifically, it was established that the possibility of transmitting information to a foreign 
government is subject to compliance with the terms and conditions of the DTC concluded 
by both countries. Among these conditions, the obligation of the receiving State to treat 
the information as secret and not to disclose it to any person (art. 26.2 OECD MTC) can 
be found. The Court noted that the obligation of secrecy imposed in the agreement is 
binding for both signatories, so, if the United States government knew, from previous 
relations with Japan, that this country violates said provision, the US would also be 
breaking the terms of the agreement. 
Concern about the problems that arise from the differences in the protection of trade 
secrets between national regulations has been addressed at the international level. As an 
example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
concluded by the WTO and the Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business 
information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, may be 
cited. These rules have established a common standard in order to harmonize the laws of 
the Member States to a certain extent in order to guarantee that a sufficient level of judicial 
protection is achieved for cases of illegal use, obtaining or disclosure of trade secrets. 
Besides the above, what is clear is that, at the moment, bank secrecy cannot be claimed 
as a reason to oppose an information request; nor can the supply be denied due to the fact 
 
 
that the information is in the hands of the companies or persons listed in the fifth section 
of the provision149. 
Closely related to this issue, the question of the taxpayer's participation in exchange 
procedures arises. As anticipated, the interests of the taxpayer on whom information is 
exchanged can be seriously affected and, therefore, it is essential to establish safeguard 
mechanisms.  
Among these protection mechanisms, the right to participate in the exchange procedure 
as an instrument to control information flows stands out: to the extent that the notification 
and participation of the tax obligor in the procedure is guaranteed, the existence of a trade 
secret that discourages the exchange can be verified at a previous stage, thus avoiding a 
defenseless situation and hard-to-repair damages150. 
The protection of taxpayers’ rights can take place in two different ways: by adopting 
specific guarantees in international instruments for information exchange or leaving its 
regulation to Member States’ national laws. Currently, primacy is given to the second 
option.  
The Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital does not regulate the rights and 
role of taxpayers in the exchange procedure, but merely points out that regulations of 
some Member States contain notification procedures. By allowing the voluntary 
cooperation of the taxpayer with competent authorities, errors can be avoided (e.g. 
identity error) and the exchange may be improved151. 
The same conclusion is reached if the network of DTCs of Latin American countries is 
analyzed, provided that most part of them refer to national regulations152.  
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Conventions such as the one signed between Panama and Barbados include more 
extensive provisions, with explicit reference to the rights of notification and participation, 
as follows: ‘In case of an exchange of information, the administrative procedural rules 
regarding taxpayers’ rights provided for in the requested Contracting State remain 
applicable before the information is transmitted to the requesting Contracting State. 
These procedures include notifying the person with regard to the request for information 
from the other Contracting State, and enabling that person to file and present his position 
to the tax administration before it issues a response to the requesting State. It is further 
understood that this provision is aimed at guaranteeing the taxpayer fair procedure and 
not at preventing or unduly delaying the exchange of information process’.  
Almost all DTCs establish provisions that seek to avoid the frustration or undue delay in 
the information exchange as a result of the application of notification rights. To this 
extent, it can be concluded that the underlying public interest in the exchange of 
information is granted primacy in detriment to the rights and guarantees of the taxpayer. 
This subordination is clearly reflected in the DTC signed between Mexico and Germany: 
‘Upon application the person concerned shall be informed of the supplied data relating 
to him and of the use to which such data are to be put. There shall be no obligation to 
furnish this information if on balance it turns out that the public interest in withholding 
it outweighs the interest of the person concerned in receiving it’153. In the same vein, 
Commentaries to Article 26 of the OECD MTC advice of the need to include exceptions 
to notification procedures in urgent cases that the exchange might result thwarted154. 
In fact, sometimes, the rights of taxpayers may jeopardize the effectiveness of the 
investigation within which the exchange of information has been requested and, in such 
a case, the rights should be limited for the sake of higher general interests -such as 
avoiding tax fraud-. However, if these exceptions are set as a general rule, the regulations 
that guarantee the protection of taxpayers would become devoid of purpose155. As a 
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consequence, fundamental rights such as legal certainty, the right to property and business 
secrecy would be systematically breached156.  
In any case, regardless of the existence of a DTC protecting the rights and guarantees of 
taxpayers, national regulations should have provided for a specific protection in this 
regard. After a thorough analysis of the question, it can be stated that, with a few 
exceptions157, national regulations do not guarantee taxpayers’ rights in the international 
exchange of tax information158. 
In addition, the Courts of each State have different views on the issue. In Spain, the 
National Court ruled on the right to communicate the request for information made by 
foreign tax authorities (specifically, France, Germany and the Netherlands). After 
analyzing both the DTCs and internal regulations, it was concluded that there was no 
obligation of making the request content available to taxpayers159. 
In brief, from the analysis of national and international information exchange instruments 
it can be concluded that the regulation on the protection of taxpayers’ rights is, at the very 
least, deficient. 
Due to the lack of participation of the taxpayer in the procedure, he is prevented from 
controlling the legality of the exchange of information, to the extent that States may be 
exchanging information without complying with the requirements demanded by DTCs. 
This problem is of particular relevance when exchanging information that may contain 
business or industrial secrets; the broad discretion of the Administration in the assessment 
of this secret nature and the lack of control by the taxpayer may cause damage that may 
be difficult to repair160.  
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4. Related applicability issues to the information exchange clause. 
Within the analysis of the information exchange clause provided for in article 26 OECD 
MTC reference should be made to further issues whose practical application has sparked 
debate.  Thus, this section will discuss the possibility of exchanging information on events 
that occurred prior to the entry into force of the DTC (retroactive exchange) along with 
issues related to the length of the information exchange procedure. Finally, based on the 
evaluations carried out by The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, the level of implementation of the standard and legal 
framework for the information exchange in Latin American countries will be presented. 
 
4.1. Retroactive application of the information exchange clause. 
The temporal scope of the information exchange clause has been raising controversies 
both at the theoretical level and also in the practice of Tax Administrations. Certainly, the 
information exchange under Article 26 will take place over the life of the DTC, although 
it might be possible to exchange information referring to tax facts and obligations arising 
prior to its entry into force. Some scholars understand that in such a case there is a 
"retroactive exchange" of information161. 
Retroactive application of rules, although not fully banned, has been treated with great 
mistrust; not foreseeable changes that might affect taxpayers’ legal sphere may imply a 
violation of the legal certainty right– as individuals adjust their performance to the 
legislation in force – 162. 
Taking into account this negative impact, non-retroactivity is the general rule governing 
the temporary application of norms. This guideline also applies to international treaties 
as stated in article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties on 23 May 1969: 
‘Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its 
provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any 
situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with 
respect to that party’. 
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Like any general rule, exceptions have been established. Thus, retroactivity is allowed 
under two circumstances: on the one hand, if a provision, based on the principles of party 
autonomy and sovereignty of States, suggests otherwise; and, on the other hand, those 
cases in which, from the provisions of the Convention, retroactivity can be inferred163. 
In relation to the latter, it has been understood that the possibility of exchanging 
information on events occurred prior to the entry into force of the DTC is a logical 
assumption insofar as the Convention usually enters into force in the middle of the tax 
period. Such situation is respectful with the taxpayers’ rights as long as it does not apply 
to already prescribed facts and tax obligations164. In addition, provided that nothing in the 
Convention establishes otherwise, and in light of the purpose of the clause -the prevention 
of tax fraud and evasion-, any interpretation that maximizes its effectiveness would be 
covered by Article 26165.  
The OECD has also favored the possibility of exchanging information obtained prior to 
the entry into force of the DTC, provided that such assistance takes place while the 
Convention is in force166.  
While we agree with the trend that states that it is possible to provide information prior 
than the Convention, it is for reasons other than those mentioned:  
Retroactivity is the application of a given rule to events that took place before the law was 
in effect, thus affecting consolidated or not-yet-concluded legal situations.  However, the 
clause of Article 26 OECD MTC is instrumental in nature and does not imply the 
retroactive application of a new substantive regulation nor does it modify those 
consolidated legal situations. Rather, this mechanism is limited to the information 
exchange, without impacting or altering any previous situation. In any case, since the 
material legal regime is not affected, the principle of legal certainty could not be violated. 
For this reason, the exchange of information on existing situations prior to the entry into 
force of the DTC should not be prohibited.  
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With regard to conventional practice, some Conventions expressly refer to the temporary 
scope of the information exchange clause, namely: on the one hand, the DTCs signed by 
Uruguay-Liechtenstein, Portugal-Hong Kong and Panama-Czech Republic deny the 
possibility of a retroactive application of the Article. Other Conventions such as those 
signed by Chile with Austria and China only restrict the retroactive application to the data 
held by banks or financial institutions, so it follows that the exchange of some other 
information is protected by the DTC. On the other hand, the DTCs Chile-Australia167 and 
Spain-Singapore168 expressly provide for the retroactivity of the exchange. 
 
4.2. Time limits for the information exchange procedure. 
Prior to the 2012 amendment, neither the wording of article 26 OECD MTC nor the 
Commentaries made any reference to the duration of the exchange procedure, leaving this 
matter at the discretion of the Contracting States. In any case, this discretion was limited 
by the principles governing the international exchange of tax information, namely: 
reciprocity, proportionality, cooperation and loyalty -from which can be inferred that 
procedures must be expedited-169. 
From early times, the need to establish temporary limits to adequately respond to 
information requests and to prevent tax fraud was revealed170. 
Consequently, in the 2012 update, Commentaries to Art. 26 MC OECD provided for the 
possibility of introducing voluntary wording in the DTC which temporarily limited the 
exchange171. Specifically, where the tax authorities of the requested Contracting State 
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were already in possession of the requested information, the time limit was of two months 
from the receipt of the information request. On the contrary, where the tax authorities of 
the requested Contracting State were not already in the possession of the information, 
such period was of six months. In the absence of such an agreement, the information had 
to be supplied as quickly as possible, except where the delay was due to legal 
impediments172. According to the Commentaries, these provisions could be applied in 
cases where the Tax Authorities had not agreed different terms173. 
Some DTCs of the Latin American network include different time limits not only to 
communicate the information, but also to certify the receipt of the request. Such is the 
case of the Conventions between Panama-Jamaica, Spain-Jamaica, Spain-Singapore, 
Spain-Uruguay, Ecuador-Singapore and Ecuador-China. 
However, sometimes, the issue is not whether deadlines for the exchange of information 
should be set in the DTCs, but if it is possible to comply with them in practice. Many 
Latin American countries do not have sufficient means to manage their own tax system, 
a situation that would be aggravated if the scarce resources are allocated to provide 
information to another State. On this premise, proposals are being developed aimed at the 
transferal of the costs to the requested State. 
Another issue raised by the establishment of a specific deadline is to determine the 
consequences of non-compliance with such time limit. The OECD, in its Commentaries, 
makes no reference to the possibility of sanctioning the non-complying State, although it 
clearly states that if the rest of the requirements demanded by Article 26 have been met, 
the request for information cannot be denied solely for the infringement of the time 
limits174. 
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4.3. The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. 
In recent years, the importance of tax transparency and tax information exchange between 
States in the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion has grown exponentially. In this 
context, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes (hereinafter, the Global Forum) has played an essential role in ensuring the 
effective application of the rules on international tax transparency175. 
The Global Forum was created within the framework of the OECD in 2000, with the 
objective of working on the risks posed by non-cooperative jurisdictions176. Nowadays, 
it constitutes the largest international cooperation network in tax matters, in which 
participate 154 member countries and non-OECD members, together with the European 
Union177.  
The main achievement of the Global Forum has been the elaboration of transparency and 
information exchange standards for tax purposes and the analysis of their implementation 
by the different jurisdictions178. In 2009 there was a turning point in response to the call 
of the G20 leaders to reinforce the implementation of these standards179. 
Thus, there was an in-depth restructuration of the Global Forum, which from that moment 
on took a more active position in the expansion of international tax information exchange 
agreements. Likewise, the engagement of the OECD in the work of the G20 was 
intensified, as it is stressed in the reports that are periodically published on the progress 
of their work180. 
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Regarding the control system for the implementation of transparency and information 
exchange standards, two phases may be identified:  Phase 1 (review of the legal 
framework) and Phase 2 (review of EOIR in practice). 
In the first round of reviews, which took place between 2010 and 2016, the Global Forum 
carried out its analysis in two phases, examining separately the legal framework and its 
effective implementation. The results of this first round of peer reviews on the exchange 
of information on request (EOIR) have been positively assessed, since just a minority of 
jurisdictions did not reach the optimal level of implementation.  
Specifically, the final assessments show that 22 jurisdictions were considered as 
“Compliant” - among which are Colombia, Spain and Mexico - and 77 as “Largely 
Compliant” - for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Portugal and Uruguay-
. Likewise, 12 jurisdictions have been classified as “Partially Compliant” - among which 
are Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic - and 3 were considered as “Non-Compliant” 
and, as a consequence, they did not submit to the second phase since an effective 
exchange of information was not guaranteed (e.g. Panama)181.  
In accordance with the conclusions of the 2016 Progress Report, since its inception, this 
peer-review system has encouraged the expansion of the DTCs network, the realization 
of substantial changes in national jurisdictions - both in the regulatory framework and 
practices - and the elimination of strict banking secrecy in more than 65 jurisdictions182.  
The international scenario evidences that solutions to tackle the fight against tax fraud 
and tax evasion have been effectively initiated, but its scope and implementation still need 
to be strengthened183. To this end, the Global Forum has agreed that all members and 
relevant non-members should be subject to a second round of review starting in 2016, to 
ensure continued compliance with and implementation of the EOIR standard. Whereas 
the first round of reviews was generally conducted as separate reviews for Phase 1 (review 
of the legal framework) and Phase 2 (review of EOIR in practice), the EOIR reviews 
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commencing in 2016 combine both Phase 1 and Phase 2 aspects into one review. Also, 
reinforced and stricter analysis standards are being applied184.  
This second peer-review round includes the analysis of the amendments introduced in the 
2012 update of Article 26 OECD MTC and its Commentaries as well as an assessment of 
the implementation levels of the OECD recommendations. Finally, a comparison is made 
of the results obtained in the first round with respect to the rating the countries would 
deserve in the second round. For instance, in the case of Costa Rica, the 2019 rating has 
been improved and it is currently classified as “largely compliant”. This is not the case 
with Spain, which has not maintained its “compliant” rating, now being regarded as 
“largely compliant”. As for Brazil, the ‘largely compliant’ rating from the first peer-
review round has been maintained185. 
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